International Policy Framework for Building Disaster Resilient Community: the Case of Sleman

Muhadi Sugiono, Ahmad Rizky M. Umar, and Dwi Prameswari

Abstract

World has experienced the great losses during various disasters in this decade. Therefore, building disaster resilient community has become a main agenda nowadays. Following the Indian Ocean Tsunami on late 2004, the stakeholders raise their commitments to hold up the progress of disaster risk reduction by optimizing various parties’ role in all levels on reducing the disaster risk. Furthermore, development is necessary to be mainstreamed in order to achieve disaster resilience effectively. In the case of Indonesia, the disaster management has been transformed into higher stage –not only by providing the programs in all stages of disaster management (pra-disaster, emergency situation, and post-disaster), but also by linking the disaster management program with development program, aftermath of the adaption and adoption process of international framework on disaster risk reduction. Furthermore, the author will analyze the program which has attached both development and disaster management through the pilot program, called Destana (Disaster Resilient Village), and has initiated on 2012. Therefore, in order to evaluate the program conducted by Indonesia government, the author will identify the implementation in the local level.

Key words: Hyogo Framework for Action, Millenium Development Goals, disaster risk reduction, resilience, development, capacity building, people participation.

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

The cost of natural disasters in 1998 alone exceeded the cost of all such disasters in the entire decade of the 1980s -Koffi Annan-

A. Background

The notion of disaster resilience is gaining its significance today as the frequency as well as the magnitude of disasters increased dramatically worldwide causing severe destruction and impacts on both human and non-human (Sugiono 2011). It has been a serious concern for the international community. And, following the Indian Ocean Tsunami, the UN General Assembly has established comprehensive approach for disaster risk reduction within which building resilient community becomes one of its key components. Endorsed by 168 countries, the approach brought about the emergence of 10-years framework of action called Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015. It aims at “the substantial reduction of disaster losses in lives and in the social, economic and environmental assets of communities and countries” through five priorities of actions: [1] to ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority, with a strong institutional basis for implementation of necessary measures, [2] to identify, assess, and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning systems, [3] to use knowledge, innovation, and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels, [4] to reduce the underlying risk factors, [5] to strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response and recovery at all levels, from the local to the national.

As a product of a comprehensive approach, Hyogo Framework clearly stresses the significance of the link between disaster and vulnerability in terms of social, economic and environmental. As a result, the very success of the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action must necessarily be understood in terms of the capacity of the disaster risk policies to address these sources of vulnerability. As the three sources of vulnerability are as a matter of fact also the three pillars of sustainable development,
namely environmental, economic and socio-political sustainability, it is important therefore to associate the international framework for building disaster resilient community with the international framework for sustainable development.

The link between resilient society and development has clearly been acknowledged now (ISDR 2003). The World Conference on Disaster Reduction in January 2005, for example, called for connecting the internationally agreed goals of development and disaster risk reduction. Now, with the initiative of the UN International Strategy Disaster Risk to mainstream disaster risk reduction in the strategies to achieve Millennium Development Goals, all the initiatives to build resilient society must necessarily work in line with the attainment of the goals of development.

The research is aimed at exploring the relations between disaster resilience and development. Linking the two has been the concern of both the practitioners of disaster risk reduction as well as those of development. The link has the consequence that building disaster resilient must necessarily be put in the context of development and that disaster risk reduction become increasingly mainstreamed in the development planning.

The proposed research has the main objective of examining how international framework for building resilient community linking disaster risk reduction and development is reflected in the national policy. This objective is elaborated into three more specific objectives:

1. To study how the international framework for building disaster resilient community as reflected in the Hyogo Framework for Action is closely connected to the framework for development.
2. To study the way in which the link of those two international frameworks is reflected into national policies on disaster risk reduction.
3. To study how the international framework works on the ground through the examination of the pilot project of desa tangguh.
B. Understanding Disaster and Development: Theoretical Framework

Disaster is the result from combination of hazard, vulnerability and insufficient capacity to reduce the potential chance of risk. According to the United Nations International Strategy for the Disaster Reduction, disaster is defined as a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic, or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources. Disaster can be occurred when hazard could not be adapted by vulnerable community.

Academics and practitioners are increasingly convinced that there is no such thing as natural disaster. Disasters do not take place simply by natural causes. It is the impact of these causes in relations to the control of resources which causes disaster to happen. This conviction is not unfounded. Disasters do not affect individuals and group randomly. Some become victims, while others remain unaffected. This clearly indicates different degrees of vulnerability of the people when it comes to natural changes. The key to deal with disasters therefore is to understand the vulnerable nature of the victims, i.e. the root causes of their vulnerability. Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary General explicitly expressed this conviction when he said that disasters emerge only when people’s lives and livelihoods are destroyed (Annan 2003).

A collaborative works involving NGOs and donor agencies developed understanding of vulnerability in terms of three categories of root causes (Anderson and Woodrow, 1989). The first source of vulnerability is physical. People are vulnerable for example because of their personal disabilities or incapabilities, and because they are ill-equipped or inappropriately facilitated. The second source of vulnerability is social. Some people become victims because they are socially excluded and marginalized in relations to resources as well as to decision making process. Finally, psychological dimension of vulnerability such as the perception of dependence also contribute to the victimhood.
Understanding disasters from the vulnerable nature of the victims has led to a paradigm shift, i.e. different ways in which disaster should be dealt with. While disaster management in the past tends to be oriented on containing the hazard from affecting the people, the new understanding of the root causes of disaster gives much more attention to the effort of minimizing vulnerability of the people (Twigg 2009). The paradigm shift has very significant implication. It is within this context that building disaster resilient society or community gains its significance.

Resilient society is probably a very broad concept. But, in essence, a resilient society is understood as a society which does not only have the capacity to prevent disaster, but also with capacity ‘to deliver quick and effective emergency assistance to the victims, and is capable of smooth transition to implementation of recovery and reconstruction’ (Posser and Peters 2010, 10). The understanding of resilient society implies an opposition of resilience and vulnerability. They constitute two extreme poles in a continuum of resilience and vulnerability. Building a resilient society, therefore, can be understood as a process of moving society away from the causes of their vulnerability toward greater capacity to cope with natural hazard as depicted in the graphic below.

As a process of getting rid of causes of vulnerability, building a resilient community is not limited to actions designed narrowly to address natural hazard. On the contrary, it presupposes very broad policies not specifically referred to the hazard. In fact, the very success of building a resilient society is closely tied to various development agendas addressing the root causes of their vulnerability and, therefore, their capacity.

How close the link between development and resilience has been subject for intensive studies. All lead to stronger evidence of the close connection between the two. Disaster
and development are related in mutual rather than unilinear causality, both positively and negatively. There are four possible links between disaster and development: [1] development increases vulnerability to disaster, [2] development reduces vulnerability to disaster, [3] disasters impede development and disasters provide development opportunities (Fordham 2007, 339). The matrix below shows the four possible links of disasters and development.

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<td><strong>Development</strong></td>
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<td>(a) Development increases vulnerability to disaster</td>
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<td>(c) Disasters impede development</td>
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Within disaster and development approach, it is very important to consider disaster as a function of development rather than ‘a natural process’. What constitute as function of development is that disaster will be recognized as the consequences of indecent development of a means to avoiding a human crisis. In the simple manner we could describe it as being in the ‘wrong place’ at the ‘wrong time’ with inadequate forms of protection (Collins, 2009). Tsunami, flood and hurricane might be part of nature but the process of human development has not adapted sufficiently to avoid crisis.

**C. Research Question**

The proposed research is conducted to address two questions:

1. What is the relations between disaster resilience and development and how international community links the two?
2. How does the government of Indonesia adopt the framework into their policies on disaster risk reduction?
D. Methodology

Methodologically the research is conducted through a combination of different research methods. It combines desk study with field research. This research is conducted through two phases: Desk Study on July-August 2013 and field research on September 2013.

The desk study constitutes the first phase of the research. It focuses on the study of the development of the framework for building resilient society and the increased awareness of its link to development. The field research will be used especially in the second phase of the research. It will be conducted mainly through in depth interviews. Policy makers, practitioners as well as the representative of the relevant community will be the target groups of the interviews. The interview will also be supplemented by direct observation and focused group discussion especially in the community of the pilot project of Desa Tangguh Bencana.

This report is constructed into five chapters. Chapter One introduces main concepts, approach, and methodology of the research. Chapter Two explains international policy framework both in disaster risk reduction and development. Chapter Three analyse how the framework is adopted in national level, both in national law and development planning process. Chapter Four draw empirical findings of the field research, which is conducted in Sleman Regency, DIY. Chapter Five gives some concluding remarks over this research.

The logical framework of this research can be seen in this scheme below:
A. Building Disaster Resilient Community: the Hyogo Framework for Action

The concept of ‘development’, according to Millennium Development Goals, is built upon the ability of society to fulfill their basic needs. This concept, basically adopted from the idea of human development, require the state to fulfill not only economic growth, but also social and economic conditions that enabling the people to fulfill their basic needs. Prior to MDGs, United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has launched an annual Human Development Index which introduces the idea of human development as a perimeter for measuring national development success. (Sen, 1999: 73). UNEP extends the concept by introducing the concept of ‘sustainable development’ that meets needs of existing generations and needs of future generations (Spangenber, 2005: 2; Marti, 2004: 53).

How is this concept of development linked to the concept of ‘resilient community’? On 18-22 January 2005, following the tsunami disaster in the Indian Ocean, The
United Nations held a world conference on Disaster Reduction in Hyogo, Japan. The main agenda of this Conference, according to Brief History of WCDR, is “to take stock of progress in disaster risk reduction accomplished since the Yokohama Conference of 1994” and “to make plans for the next ten years”.

This Conference then adopts Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 as a policy to build a resilient community and governance to disaster. Declared upon the completion of Yokohama Strategy (2004), this Framework provided a strategy and approach to reduce vulnerabilities and risks to hazards (Marti, 2004: 53; HFA, 2005). As clearly stated in the Resolution 214/2014, The UN considers that disaster risk assessment as an integral component of development plans and poverty eradication programs (UN, 2004). As stated on Report of UN Secretary General, the most important goal of this Framework is to achieve more effective integration of disaster risk considerations into sustainable development policies, planning and programming at all levels, with special emphasis on disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness and vulnerability reduction (UN, 2005). Thus, since its establishment, the Hyogo Framework for Action has proposed integration between the concept of development and resilience, both in national and local level.

There are two aims of Hyogo Framework for Action: (1) reduce vulnerabilities; and (2) reduce risk to hazards. Following the UNISDR Strategy (2004), this Framework defined ‘vulnerability’ as “the conditions determined by physical, social, economic, and environmental factors or processes, which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards”. The framework also define ‘hazard’ as “potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or human activity that may cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation. Hazards can include latent conditions that may represent future threats and can have different origins: natural or induced by human processes” (HFA, 2005). One interesting point that can be induced through
This concept of vulnerability and hazard is the inclusion of ‘social and economic factors’ as an inseparable part of ‘disaster’ that should be addressed in order to deal with disaster. Thus, this concept implies a comprehensive framework to deal with disaster that leads to a conviction that disaster reduction is understood a matter of development and thus should be linked with Millennium Development Goals (Marti, 2004; HFA, 2005).

This Framework starts with the explanation of some challenges posed by the latest event of disasters. The Framework concerned that disaster risk is now a global issue; it arises when hazards interact with physical, social, economic and environmental vulnerabilities. Thus, there should be policy frameworks that integrate the disaster risk reduction efforts with internationally agreed development goals (Millennium Development Goals). The Framework address that Yokohama Strategy (1994) should be strengthened by addressing disaster risks in the context of sustainable development and building resilience through enhanced national and local capabilities to manage and reduce risk (HFA, 2005).

By reviewing the progress of implementation of Yokohama Strategy, the Conference then set up a target that should be fulfilled by ten years. The conference targets the *substantial reduction of disaster losses, in lives and in the social, economic and environmental assets of communities and countries.*

This 10-years target is to be achieved within five priorities for actions which becomes a specific framework to be adopted by the parties of conference. In its general consideration, the Conference is taking into account that each State has the primary responsibility for its own sustainable development and for taking effective measures to reduce disaster risk. Thus, an integrated and multi-hazard approach to disaster risk reduction should be factored into policies, planning and programming related to sustainable development activities. (HFA, 2005).
This general consideration is directly link the Hyogo Framework for Actions with general concept of development. In Hyogo Framework, there are five main priorities actions that should be fulfilled by states in order to build a resilient community. The responsibility to implement and follow-up these priority actions, according to the report of UN Secretary General, lies with States, involving national public administration structures, the scientific community and civil society (UN, 2005).

The Hyogo Framework for Actions contains five priority for actions which is serving as a guideline for implementation in national level. The Five Priority Actions designed in Hyogo Framework for Actions are:

1. Creating a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation
2. Identifying, assessing and monitoring disaster risk and enhancing ‘early warning’.
3. Using knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels.
4. Reduce the underlying risk factors (associated with the level of development, special conditions such as insularity typical of small island development states).
5. Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.

These priority actions are derived into guiding principles and practical means for the implementation in each States. With these guiding principles, Hyogo Framework for Action can be easily adopted as national policies and legislation products. Annually, the UNISDR launch a progress report to evaluate the achievement of this Framework in each States.

B. Human Rights Based Approach to Development: the Millennium Development Goals
The rise of Hyogo Framework for Action as an international policy framework in managing disaster cannot be separated with another international framework for Development: the *Millennium Development Goals* or the MDGs (Marti, 2004). Since 2000, the MDGs has been serving as an umbrella for development project in United Nations. Inspired by the ide of ‘Human Development’ coined by some collaborative works of Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum, and Mahbub ul-Haq, the MDGs offers a Human Rights Based approach for Development which includes human rights in its approach to development (Maboloc, 2008). The MDGs is now becoming a main campaign led by United Nations to combat any issues related to poverty or disability around the world.

The Rise of MDGs as global platform for development, which is adopted by many states as their development agenda, can be tracked to the establishment of Human Development Report by the United Nations in 1990. Drawn upon a human rights based approach introduced by Amartya Sen, a notable Indian scholars, UNDP launched Human Development Report with a measurable index as a parameter to measure how the development project articulate people’s rights in fulfilling their basic needs (Noorbarkhsh, 1998; Maboloc, 2008; UNDP, 2013).

The idea was derived from the concept of ‘human capabilities’ to be obtained in making development works. According to Sen, economic development should be seen as a process to enhance people’s capability and choice to fulfill their basic needs (UN History, 2009; Noorbarkhsh, 1998). Since the establishment in 1990, UNDP launched annual report that measure the achievement of Human Development Index in each states.

The establishment of Human Development Report (HDR) and the measurable Human Development Index (HDI) has come to a larger debate when the UN, under the leadership of Koffi Annan, planned to hold a Millennium Assembly in 2000. Before the Assembly Annan launched a report entitled *‘We the Peoples:The Role of*
the United Nations in the 21st Century” which addressed many issues to be discussed in the next Millennium Assembly. This report addressed poverty, gender equality, and many problems that should be addressed collectively in the new millennium (Hulme, 2009; Annan, 2000).

Annan’s report was highlighted by many UN member states and has lead to a new negotiation between UN member states, especially the OECD states, over what should UN do in the next millennium. The negotiation took place at the Summit. The summit addressed a need to combat poverty in a more comprehensive approach, and that the poverty reduction strategy should be integrated to development (Hulme, 2009).

Hereafter, UN member states agreed to create a global platform to include poverty reduction in development process in each UN member states. Thus, the Summit adopted “the United Nations Millennium Declaration” that put a big attention in poverty reduction policy through global development project. The UN Secretary-General then finalized the declaration into a long-term strategy and measurable output which is known as “Millennium Development Goals”.

The MDGs combines human rights based approach which was introduced earlier by UNDP and some issues addressed in Kofi Annan’s report. It is serving both as development target to be achieved by any UN member states, especially those who were identified as ‘third world’ and as a framework for any development project within the United Nations. As a measurable target, the MDGs provides eight goals to be halved by 2015, including:

1. To eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
2. To achieve universal primary education
3. To promote gender equality and empowering women
4. To reduce child mortality rates
5. To improve maternal health
6. To combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases
7. To ensure environmental sustainability
8. To develop a global partnership for development

Those targets have been agreed 189 UN member states and 10 International Organizations and is currently under completion. Every years, along with the annual Human Development Report, the UN launched some reports related to the achievement of these goals. the MDGs is also becoming as a framework for many projects within the UN, by connecting many projects with the achievement of the Goals. The manifest can be seen in the Hyogo Framework for Action, which is serving as framework for building resilient community in global level.

C. Connecting HFA with MDGs

How is MDGs and HFA connected? The Hyogo Framework was resulted from the World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, as a response to the latest Tsunami and Earthquake disaster in Indies Ocean, December 2004. It is drawn upon the review of Yokohama Strategy and acknowledge that to reduce disaster risk, quick response is inadequate. There should be an ‘integrated, multi-hazard approach to disaster risk reduction’ to be factored in national policy. Thus, the HFA itself has acknowledged the role of development in reducing disaster risk.

Further, the HFA taken into account the Millenium Development Goals as a main consideration in making policy and priorities for Action in the framework. It is mentioned in the Priorities for Action in the HFA that,

Disaster risk reduction is a cross-cutting issue in the context of sustainable development and therefore an important element for the achievement of internationally agreed development goals, including those contained in the Millennium Declaration. In addition, every effort should be made to use humanitarian assistance in such a way that risks and future vulnerabilities will be lessened as much as possible.

(Hyogo Framework for Action, pp. 5)
That consideration reflects the linkage between HFA and MDGs in international level. Since its very origins, MDGs has been serving as a consideration for disaster risk reduction policy provided by HFA. It implies a broader connection in national and local level. Since HFA serves as international framework for disaster risk reduction policy, the framework should be transformed as national policy, both in legal and development planning policy. The operationalization of HFA is measured through the implementation of Law and how it is included in development practices.

On the other side, the MDGs also transformed as a program in national level. The nexus of MDGs and HFA can be seen in daily practice of development program, both directly and indirectly. In Indonesia, the MDGs has included in many technocratic programs within Presidential Office and is serving as umbrella for many development projects in national level. The MDGs also plays a main role in directing projects within National Agency for Development Planning –Bappenas. The central role of MDGs in development process influences many sides of disaster risk reduction policy, which is included in national action plan and national law. It opens possibilities to link the MDGs and disaster risk reduction policy in national level.

Thus, while the HFA and the MDGs has been broadly connected in international level, the possibility to connect these frameworks in national level has been opened. In this table below we can see how the concept of ‘resilience’ provided by HFA and the concept of ‘development’ promoted by MDGs met and construct a new discourse on disaster governance in national and local level.

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<td>Connection between HFA and MDGs</td>
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As a process of getting rid of causes of vulnerability, ‘building a resilient community’ presupposes a very broad policy not specifically referred to the hazard. In its context, the Hyogo Framework for Action proposes a clear basis for the state to create its disaster risk reduction policy in a very specific framework for action. The Hyogo Framework for Action can be understood as a ‘norm’ for disaster risk reduction policy that should be normalized in national disaster risk reduction policy.

Thus, this is how we connect the two concepts which has mentioned above. The concept of ‘resilient community’ proposed by Hyogo Framework for Action can only be operationalized if it is adopted in a national policy and implemented in the very local level of society. In this context the concept of ‘development’ can be taken into account and the international framework for development which has agreed upon the MDGs plays significant role. Hyogo Framework for Action has called each state to integrate the disaster risk reduction policy to their development and
planning policy and thus making resilient community to be achieved both by disaster risk reduction and development.
CHAPTER THREE
ADOPTING THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK TO NATIONAL POLICY: THE INDONESIAN EXPERIENCE

“Kesetiakawanan dan semangat kemanusiaan adalah modal dasar dalam upaya pengurangan resiko bencana. Terkait dengan itu, upaya-upaya pengurangan resiko bencana harus sesuai dengan kaidah-kaidah kemanusiaan internasional yang berlaku”

-Rencana Aksi Nasional Pengurangan Risiko Bencana, 2006-2009

A. Disaster Governance in Indonesia Before HFA
At the beginning of 2005, aftermath of Tsunami Disaster in Indies Ocean, United Nations convened an international conference on disaster risk reduction. The most important result of this conference was the initiation of Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), which was become a legal framework for post-disaster Governance. The establishment of Hyogo Framework was followed by the 1st Asian Ministerial Conference in Disaster Risk Reduction (AMCDRR) which was resulted Beijing Action as regional framework for disaster risk reduction policy.

How does the Government of Indonesia link Hyogo Framework for Action with the Millennium Development Goals in its national policy? This question becomes the main concern of this section. Indonesia was among the state who vulnerable to disaster and is very concerned with disaster (Bappenas, 2006: 1-2). In the beginning of 2005, Indonesia has just got a huge loss after Tsunami swept Aceh at the end of 2005. But unfortunately, Indonesia does not have both legal and institutional framework to cope with disaster. For example, Indonesia has no Law that sustainably governs disaster management (Hadi, 2008).
The last governing regulation in responding disaster was Presidential Decree (Keputusan Presiden/Keppres) 43/1990 on the establishment of National Coordinating Council for Disaster Management (Lassa, 2010). This council is actually an ad-hoc council which consists of retired General and active bureaucrats (UNDP, 2007). On the other side, Indonesia only has Law 6/1946 on Emergency Situation which was built under the early independence war situation (Prameswari, 2013).

In institutional level, Indonesia did not have a permanent agency that was specifically working on disaster management. Indonesia used to have a National Coordinator Agency (BAKORNAS-PB), an ad-hoc Agency working on disaster response. But in fact, this agency served only as a ‘shelter’ for retired general or politicians. Thus, there is no permanent activity related to disaster management or disaster risk reduction policy.

In provincial level, this ad-hoc agency commands some Implementation Coordinating Units which coordinating activities related to quick response when the disaster happened (UNDP, 2007: 6). They were acclaimed to have “lack of management capacity on disaster response” and “lack of understanding in disaster risk reduction” (Hadi, 2008). Thus, it can be concluded that Indonesia has a weak both institutional and legal basis of disaster management before 2005.

To sum up, phases of disaster risk management Policy and Regulation in Indonesia before 2005 can be classified in the table below:
### Table of Disaster Management Phase in Indonesia

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Source: “Institutional Vulnerability and Governance...”, Jonathan Lassa

Source: Prameswari (2013)

B. The Law 24/2007: Incorporating HFA into National Law

Tsunami that hit Aceh in 2004 has proven the disaster management in Indonesia to be ineffective. As indicated by the Government, approximately 129,775 deaths,
38,786 missing and 504,518 persons displaced in Aceh after the Tsunami. This total loss reflected some contradictions brought by previous disaster management. Based on the experience, Indonesia started to improve the disaster management by complying with the newly-established policy framework: Hyogo Framework for Action. This compliance began in 2005 with two steps: policy and legal reform.

Since it is clearly mentioned in Hyogo Framework for Action that each state should integrate disaster risk reduction with institutional and legal framework, Indonesia managed to build a sustainable legal and institutional bases of disaster risk reduction. Soon after the framework initiated in international level, several civil society organizations under the banner of *Masyarakat Penanggulangan Bencana Indonesia* (MPBI) endorsed a draft of Disaster Management Law to be legalized in The House of Representative (DPR). This new law draft included the Hyogo Framework for Action to be a more permanent legal framework in Disaster Risk Reduction policy in Indonesia (Pujiono, 2007).

At the same time, the Government of Indonesia also managed to comply with Beijing Action which puts some emphasis in national action plan that include HFA to bureaucratic process. UNDP played significant role in endorsing the policy and law making process. It is proved in its central role in drafting the Law and supporting the initiation of National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction through its cooperation with National Development Agency (Bappenas).

At the beginning of 2005, UNDP facilitated some legal drafting trainings, workshops, and discussions through Emergency Response and Transitional Recovery (ERTR) Project. This project provided some capacity enhancement for the stakeholders, especially those who involves in public policy and law making process. This project led to a momentum in 2005 when the coalitions brought the draft of Disaster Management Law. Soon in 2005, the Disaster Management Law was noted by The House of Representative to be discussed in the Commission VIII of The House.
UNDP worked collaboratively with some stakeholders including University Forum, MPBI, CARE International and other civil society organizations to endorse the human rights-based perspective in Disaster Management Law (UNDP, 2007).

This advocacy process took two years until the Law is enacted in parliament. According to UNDP, broad based support was founded upon strong and well-coordinated collegial networks within the disaster management community, international partners, and the related bureaucracies within the Indonesian government (UNDP, 2007: 9). This advocacy process was led by Majelis Penanggulangan Bencana Indonesia (MPBI) along with another national and international civil society. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that the advocacy process, including dialogue and issue mainstreaming has been conducted since 2003 and the enactment of Law 24/2007 was only a momentum for advocacy (UNDP, 2007: 10).

The Law 24/2007 consists of many values that are contained in Hyogo Framework for Action. For example, in Article 6, it is clearly stated that disaster risk reduction will be integrated with development through the government policy. The Law also stated that the Government is responsible to guarantee people from the impact of disaster, fulfill people’s basic rights (including refugee) based on minimum standard of public service, and the government shall also allocate appropriate budget in disaster risk reduction (Law 24/2007, article 6).

More specifically, this law also give a mandate to establish the National Agency of Disaster Management (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana-BNPB) as a central coordinating unit managing disaster in two level: policy making and implementation (Law 24/2007, article 13). This agency becomes a central governing institution both in disaster response and disaster risk reduction.
In policy making process, it can be concluded that UNDP has successfully merged the Disaster Management Law with the fulfillment of MDGs Target. According to UNDP, the institutionalization of HFA can help achieve MDGs in the context of disaster risk reduction. UNDP believes that the MDGs target can be achieved in 2015 if the society got no disaster that possibly harm the MDGs achievement. But if there is any disaster that harms society, disaster risk reduction can facilitate people to avoid any hazard that is possibly created by disaster, and in other words it can help achieving MDGs target normally (UNDP, 2010).

The inclusion of MDGs value in the Disaster Management Law can be understood as the way UNDP link HFA with MDGs in the context of lawmaking process. It becomes a proof of linkage between disaster risk reduction and development in the HFA regime of disaster management.

**C. National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction (RAN-PRB): Incorporating HFA into Development Planning**

But the law itself does not adequately putting a strong institutional basis in disaster risk reduction policy. UNDP addressed that DRR policy should also transformed in governmental level (UNDP, 2007). While the draft of Law was discussed in parliaments, UNDP gave supports to the national action plan on disaster risk reduction (*Rencana Aksi Nasional – Pengurangan Risiko Bencana/RAN-PRB*) which aims to construct a comprehensive and sustainable approach in regulating disaster risk reduction policy (Bappenas, 2006: I-3). RAN-PRB was a mandate of Beijing Action which was formulated on the 1st Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction.

This document inserts some concepts proposed by UNDP such as human rights and society based risk management. The RAN-PRB document consists of strategic plan to be pursued by the government in order to the inclusion of some MDGs approach in seeing disaster. For example, this national action plan put some characters that
should be included in disaster risk reduction policy, such as the affirmation of right to life and government’s responsibility to take care of people’s life in the context of disaster resilience. fulfill the HFA priorities.

The most interesting point that we can find in this document is the inclusion of some rights-based approach in seeing disaster. For example, this national action plan put some characters that should be included in disaster risk reduction policy, such as the affirmation of right to life and government’s responsibility to take care of people’s life in the context of disaster resilience. It can be concluded that those approach reflects the influence of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in RAN-PRB. It can be understood since the establishment RAN-PRB was supported by UNDP through their funded projects.

RAN-PRB also put accountability as a value for disaster risk reduction which is implemented through enhancing participation, equity, justice, and gender-sensitive policy (Bappenas, 2006: IV-2). It was applied for 4 years (2006-2009) and extended for the next 3 years (2010-2012), functioned as guidance for governmental unit that works on disaster risk reduction.

RAN-PRB fills the gap found in Disaster Management Law. As we have already seen, the Disaster Management Law provides legal frameworks to be pursued by the Government in order to obtain HFA priorities. But this Law is still cannot be operated if it is not supported by technical assistance and development planning (UNDP, 2007). Thus, when Bappenas took lead by designing RAN-PRB, the operationalization of this Law into development planning process can be pursued and HFA can also be linked by development agenda.

The analysis above showed that HFA is adopted as national policy through the support and assistance of UNDP along with many civil society organizations. The involvement of UNDP leads to a possibility of disaster and development linkage in
national level. Though it is not clearly mentioned in the legal text, the involvement and some proof that we found in disaster risk reduction programs show that disaster risk reduction is managed under the disaster and development approach as proposed by MDGs. The adoption process of HFA in national level can be seen in this diagram:

**Diagram 2.1**

The Adoption of HFA in National Policy

![Diagram 2.1](image)

Based on the diagram, we can concluded that Hyogo Framework for Action was successfully inserted into national policy framework in Indonesia. But it is not free
of criticism. There are two important points to be criticized in Disaster Management Law and RAN-PRB.

Firstly, the Disaster Management Law and RAN-PRB tends to be very state-centrist. Both of them put state as central actor in Disaster Management and only put a little attention with people’s participation. As a consequence, the implementation seems to be state-centered and in there is only a narrow limit of society involvement in disaster management. For example, in the Disaster Management Law, ‘society involvement’ in disaster management is only covered in two articles (Article 26 & 27) of 85 articles in this Law.

These two articles ambiguously rule people’s rights and obligations in term of disaster risk reduction, that ‘people have some rights to get their basic needs if the disaster occurs’ (article 26). There is no article that contains how to build a participatory mechanism that can put people as subject rather that as victim of disaster.

Secondly, because it tends to be very state-centrist, when Disaster Management Law and RAN-RB are put on the national development agenda, the process tends to be very technocratic. Since 2004, Indonesia has applied decentralization that give some authorities to govern local resources to local government. Thus, most of the development planning is conducted in local (regional and provincial) level. With this transfer of authority, most of the effective coordination in disaster management is conducted through Regional Disaster Management Agency (Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah).

But one thing that is missing is the absence of specific institutional framework that is operated in development planning in local level. Although there is RAN-PRB, that gives specific programs for bureaucratic institutions in managing disaster, it is
operated only in national level. The very specific local development process has been forgotten both from UU 24/2007 or RAN-PRB.

As a consequence, the disaster management in local level tends to operate in a very technocratic manner. ‘Society-based disaster management’ that was brought by HFA and transformed to UU 24/2007 and RAN-PRB is collided with local development process.

To sum up, the process of Disaster Management Law (UU 24/2007) and National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction (RAN-PRB) reflects a direct linkage between two International Policy Frameworks on building resilient community: Hyogo Framework for Actions and Millennium Development Goals. To links the two, UNDP played significant role in building a comprehensive and integrated policy framework in national level. The implementation of this framework in local level will be discussed in the next part.
CHAPTER FOUR
IMPLEMENTING POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR BUILDING RESILIENT COMMUNITY: THE CASE OF SLEMAN


-Aning Susiani, Secretary of PNPM Program in Sindumartani-

A. Guidelines for Implementation: The Concept of Desa Tangguh Bencana
A truly global response to the catastrophe problem requires a stronger basis of local and regional preparedness, which will require effort on the part of all players, from local communities to national governments and international organization (Alexander, 2006). However, local communities are in the frontline – though there is the worldwide and/or national relief system has been set as coordinators, because they are the ones who are directly affected with disaster risk when they have not thought about reducing the disaster risk.

Furthermore, in the Hyogo Framework for Actions (HFA), it is also defined that disasters can be substantially reduced if people (local communities) are well informed and motivated towards a culture of disaster prevention and resilience, and it is all collected, compiled, and disseminated through the relevant knowledge and information on hazards, vulnerabilities and capacities (HFA, 2005).

In Indonesia, the linkage of HFA and MDGs is regulated on the Law 24/2007 the linkage is also clearly defined that government authority on disaster management
is related with development. It lays on Law 24/2007 Article 7, stating that The authority of the government over disaster management shall encompass stipulation of disaster management policy in line with national development policy and development planning that includes elements of disaster management policy (Law 24/2007).

HFA has stated that disaster risk reduction effort is necessary to be held upto the lowest level, and it is stated in HFA that local society is the frontline in the disaster risk reduction efforts because they directly face the disaster. Therefore, in order to comply with HFA and also for the sake of the resilience of its communities, Indonesia has launched the program which emphasize the capacity of local community to (independently) overcome the disaster risk on 2012, and it is ruled under the regulation of Head of Disaster Management National Agency No. 1 year 2012.

The program is called Disaster Resilient Village (Desa/Kelurahan Tangguh Bencana –Destana). Destana program aims to strengthen the capacity of local community which are united in villages on independently adapting and overcoming disaster, as well as recovering from disaster risk (BNPB, 2012: 16). Therefore, the Destana program will be capable to identify the hazards in their living area, to organize the resources among community, to reduce the vulnerability, and to raise the capacity due to disaster risk reduction. Those capabilities is applied through development plan which consist of prevention, awareness, disaster risk reduction, and capacity building on the process of recovery aftermath of emergency situation.

As community base disaster risk reduction effort, Destana program focus on empowering the local community to be able to plan, to identify, to analyze, to overcome, to evaluate, and to reduce the disaster risk themselves. Indeed, the government contributes on supervising the program and delivering the financial supports, and the amount of financial support is varied in each regency. In the
regulation, Destana is classified into three stages, Pratama (early), Madya (middle), and Utama (supreme). Destana is also formed as development efforts on the disaster risk reduction in the local level.

The main purpose is to reduce the disaster risk factors and the vulnerability, and in the same time also raise the capacity of preparedness and awareness, which is planned and implemented by society as the main actors. Those have been also identified by Indonesia government in Rule of Head of National Agency on Disaster Management No. 01 Year 2012 about Disaster Resilient Village (Desa Tangguh Bencana –Destana). One of area that has been establishing Destana is Yogyakarta provinces. All regencies have managed to establish Destana, though they havent established in all vulnerable village area. However, the most vulnerable villages have been conducted as Destana.

Destana has been formed in Yogyakarta Province since early 2012. By the year 2012, there were five resilient villages already, and those are Desa Sidoharjo (kec. Samigaluh, Kab. Kulonprogo, vulnerable to landslide), Desa Glagah (Kec. Temon, Kab. Kulonprogo, vulnerable to tsunami), Desa Terbah, Desa Semoyo, and Desa Nglegi (Kec. Patuk, Kab. Gunung Kidul, vulnerable to landslide). Then, other resilient villages, Desa Umbulharjo (Kec. Cangkringan, Kab. Sleman, vulnerable to volvano eruption and earthquake), formed by Social Department, Desa Purwobinangun (Kec. Pakem, Kab Sleman), formed by Indonesia Red Cross (PMI), Desa Gadingsari, and Desa Poncosari (Kab. Bantul, vulnerable to earthquake and tsunami), formed by Society Empowerment Director, has been formed earlier before BPBD has established.

On 2013, some villages, suc as Desa Jangkaran (vulnerable to tsunami), Desa Sindumartani (Kec. Ngemplak, vulnerable to “cold lava flood”), Desa Candirejo, Desa Karangsari (vulnerable to landslide), and Kel. Pandean (vulnerable to flood).
Destana in DIY has been formed by BPBD DIY based on the national and regency budget.

The research is emphasized in the area of Sleman due to high disaster risk that Sleman has been facing whole time. Based on certain characters, such as geological, topographical, climatological, demographical, and sociological characters, Sleman is classified into vulnerable area. As vulnerable area, Sleman government has realized that they need to initiate the programs which lead their preparedness and awareness on facing disasters. The periodical hazard which faced by Sleman at least once in two years is Merapi eruption. Therefore, Sleman has to be well-prepared and well-aware on overcoming this natural hazards.

In the earlier years, it could be seen that they had not been forming the contingency plan to define what they have to do, not only when disaster occurred, but also when it is on the stage of pra-disaster. However, aftermath of the establishment of Law No. 24 Year 2007, continued with the establishment of BNPB on 2008, BPBD DIY on 2011, and the establishment of BPBD Sleman (in the regency level) on early 2012, Sleman has been forming well contingency plan, and it is legalized through the Regency Regulation (Peraturan Daerah) No. 7 Year 2013 about the Disaster Management. It is clearly stated that the disaster management implied on the regency development plan, as it is mentioned on the Article 14 of the regulation. Furthermore in another article, the regulation states that “the disaster risk reduction is managed to reduce the hazards and vulnerability and also raise the role of people on overcoming the disaster-occurred” (Regency Law 7/2013).

Those articles lead to the existence of disaster management that cannot be separated from development and indeed how important the role of people themselves on those two terms, disaster management and development. Indeed, the success of disaster management will not be achieved when development and people participation are not raised. Therefore, refering to the Head of BNPB
Regulation No. 1 Year 2012 and Regency Regulation No. 7 Year 2013, Sleman has established the Destana in Desa Sindumartani on July 2013, and in the same time continue the program of prepared village (Desa Siaga) that has been established earlier by other department in Desa Umbulharjo. Regarding on this case, the research focus on these two villages, Desa Umbulharjo and Desa Sindumartani.

Based on information from the Head of Preparedness and Awareness Division, BPBD Sleman, the budget of Destana formation in Desa Sindumartani is Rp. 250.000.000,00 comes from national budget through BNPB. Desa Sindumartani is categorized as Destana Pratama. It is due to the early formation and also the lack of society preparedness and awareness, and it is demonstrated on the various problems that society face. On the other side, Desa Umbulharjo, according Head of Preparedness and Awareness Division, BPBD Sleman, is categorized as Destana Madya. It is due to the society preparedness and awareness on disaster risk that they possibly face in their area.

B. Two Faces of Development in Post-Disaster Community

This research tries to review the implementation of Destana program in the existed resilient village, Umbulharjo and Sindumartani. Several interviews and observation are conducted in these villages. The first resilient village, Desa Umbulharjo, has been existed since 2007 (before Destana Program established by Sleman Regency Government). Desa Sindumartani followed five years later, held by BPBD on 2013. As it is mentioned earlier, Desa Umbulharjo is Destana Madya, and Desa Sindumartani, which is directly formed by BPBD is categorized as Destana Pratama. Therefore, the researcher is willingful to identify how the real situation is and what the real problem, which they face, is.

The implementation of the policy framework cannot be separated from existing development scheme in the village. There are two development scheme that is operated in the post-disaster management in Desa Sindumartani and Desa
Umbulharjo. **Firstly,** Technocratic Development Scheme, which is state-led and use the bureaucracy structure as the main pillar. In the context of post-disaster development, this development scheme involved with government structures in the province and regency levels, in this case BPBD is the main actor. **Secondly,** Social Development Scheme, which is led by World Bank and it emphasize on the social capital as the main pillar. In the context of post-disaster development, this development scheme involved with social community as the base actor on distributing the funds.

The first scheme operates through distributing the funds annually from national budget and province and/or regency budget, General Allocation Funds (Dana Alokasi Umum-DAU), and Village Fund Allocation (Alokasi Dana Desa-ADD). The operational mechanism of this development regime is annual fund distribution. In the early year, the village propose funds through Deliberation Development Plan (Musyawarah Rencana Pembangunan-Musrenbang) in the local (village) level, then they propose to the Musrenbang in the regency level, and synchronizing the funds with related programs from government institution. Furthermore, through the scheme above, the post-disaster development would be synchronized with programs from technocratic government, then there would be decision whether it is accepted or not accepted.

The development process in Sindumartani is using a ‘Musrenbang’ process. To propose a development plan, villagers has to come to Musrenbang and aspire their needs to the forum. The process goes to a negotiation among the villagers. If the Musrenbang pass the aspiration, they also have to compete in the higher level (Kecamatan and Regency) with another villages and bureaucratic unit in Regency Government.

The process is basically a long process and is prone to be neglected by the local elites. In Desa Sindumartani it is demonstrated that the development, which is very
technocratic and also rely on bureaucracy, is tenuous when it faces structural challenges. For example, the problem of damaged roads, due to heavy loads from the trucks which transporting sands and passing by anytime, becomes one of problems that currently faced by people in Desa Sindumartani. Due to the long budget and development planning process, which has to wait until the upcoming year(s) and has to be synchronized with the budget capacity from government, the damaged roads cannot be repaired.

A villager in Sindumartani said that the road problem first emerged in 2010 aftermath the Merapi eruption, after sand is identified as profitable resource to be exploited. The climax of this problem is demonstration from Sindumartani villagers by posting some posters, banners, and simple billboards that aspiring their objections to sand trucks to pass throught the village road (interview, 11 September 2013).

It can be concluded that there is no significant improvement in the village road since 2010. This problem can be interpreted as the impact of long technocratic process in development planning. On the other side, people's interest should also compete with government’s interest in the sand mining which gives income to local government.

In Desa Umbulharjo, the development that is very technocratic is demonstrated from the high role of Social Department on providing the food supply (logistic) for the “barns” (lumbung pangan), as one of the ways to be prepared on possibly disaster-occurred. As what is stated by the village official (secretary), the barn and logistics are supplied by Social Department and it is based on their proposal. The instant foods are also delivered with the help from Tagama in order to prevent the hunger when disaster suddenly occurred (interview, 10 September 2013).
It is very interesting that the government give so much attention on this village (Desa Umbulharjo). First, the food is not necessary to be supplied currently in their barn because the typical hazard in this village could be easily identified. Second, though it is necessary to provide the food supply, it is more important that the government could empower the people to think and to prepare about food supply on their own, and it aims to raise their capacity to be autonomous and also to achieve the sustainability when the could independently react.

The contrast situation is already shown in both villages, Desa Sindumartani and Desa Umbulharjo. When Desa Sindumartani faces very big problem that affect their economic life, which is the damaged road, Desa Umbulharjo even receives the food supply from government, though the situation is not urgent. Indeed, both villages receive training, socialization, and education on disaster management, as the implementation of PROTAP of disaster management in the local level (village), but the imbalance does exist.

Different story is demonstrated in the scheme of social development, conducted by World Bank, through PNPM. This program has been initiated since 2000 through District Development Program (Program Pembangunan Kecamatan-PPK) as its umbrella. The development scheme concentrates on strengthening the community in order to raise the empowerment. As stated by the secretary of program, they only facilitate to deliver the disbursement of funded proposal. The society is trained until they are able to calculate and manage the fund themselves (interview, 11 September 2013).

So, this scheme of development lays the communities in the society to distribute the funds of social development projects. The data from Desa Sindumartani has demonstrated that this scheme runs separately from the scheme of technocratic development from government. Society establishes their own communities,
facilitated by PNPM officials in village, and along with their communities, the funding is distributed to people in order to build certain public facilities.

In Desa Umbulharjo, one of project that is facilitated by PNPM is building the roadblock in the permanent resettlement for people from Pelemsari small village. Furthermore, in both villages the financial aid from PNPM also focused on expanding their economic activities and presenting markets to the society. For example, the tourism program in both villages, Minawisata (Desa Sindumartani) adn Wisata Merapi Tour (Desa Umbulharjo), also supported from this funding (PNPM). However, the capitals in both villages are different, so it brings different result regarding its success as well.

Interesting information is shown from Desa Sindumartani. In this village PNPM is unable to address external problems, especially damaged roads that becomes big problem in Desa Sindumartani. It is clear mentioned that PNPM could not support society to repair the roads. According to PNPM, its program only focused on strengthening the society capacity to face the competitive economic activity nowadays. PNPM views damaged roads as government responsibility to enhance its capacity. It can be assessed from an interview with PNPM secretary in the village that the classification of road (as village/regency road) matters in determining what sector should be built in scope of PNPM programs. The road in Sindumartani is merely a village road and the village government should be responsible to repair it with their own budget (interview, 11 September 2013).

From the explanation above, it can be understood that two development regimes operated in Sleman Regency has implied gap in society. It has to be addressed. We have seen that neither the first or second development regime can adequately provide comprehensive approach in reducing disaster risk in post-disaster phase.
The first regime, the technocratic development logic which lies on state bureaucratic capacity, has failed to address some structural problems emerged beyond government’s standard operating procedure. The ‘statist’ development regime based their activities on what has been instructed on government’s law or programs. As a consequence, government use the same approach to every village in Sleman without considering any structural problems appears in the village. The development achievement then depends on social capital in the society and implies a visible gap in the society.

The second development regime, the social development led by World Bank through PNPM, has significantly filled the gaps left by the technocratic regime. They utilize social capital from society and use them as a tool to empower people in society itself. Within this approach, some groups in villages are able to develop their economic and social capacity to fulfill their basic needs. But nonetheless the main problem – infrastructure— still cannot be addressed within this perspective. Their emphasis on people’s internal capacity make them unable to address some structural/external problems that affect society. Such problems like sand mining or broken road is seen as government’s responsibility and it has nothing to do with people’s capacity.

Thus, these two development regimes have strengths and weaknesses. Theoretically, the technocratic logic in local development is seen as ‘legacy’ of previous political regime and presumably inherit some problems from the past (Hadiz, 2010). This research is aiming to analyze these development problems in political economy perspective, so that any factors that affect development in post-disaster community can be identified more comprehensively.

C. The Politics of Resource Management: Sand Mining and Development Gap

To analyze why development fails to provide comprehensive and adequate approach to reducing disaster risk, the political economy of local development
should be taken into account. Within political economy perspective, the development in society aftermath of Merapi eruption is based on how they manage the available and valuable resources. In Desa Sindumartani, the available resources are Merapi panorama aftermath eruption, that currently becomes the tourism sector, and materials from volcanos, in this case is sands.

However, in Desa Sindumartani the valuable resource is sand, and the problem is many people want to exploit the sands as their capital of business in order to enhance their profits. This sand mining problem has reflected the “curse of natural resources” that explode when natural resources is placed in the nexus between politics and business (Stiglitz, 2006). Thus, the problem of sand mining in Sleman is in fact a development problem even in the very local context.

For many people in Desa Sindumartani, the sand mining becomes an external problem because (1) the sand miners are not people from Desa Sindumartani; (2) the retribution and sharing mechanism are imbalanced. As said by head of small village Playen, Desa Sindumartani, sand miners are mostly coming from outside of Sindumartani and the village officials get a little profit sharing (interview, 9 September 2013).

Sand becomes a resource that is accumulated by external actors to raise the profit, and it is apparently also facilitated by government. State has certain interest on the existance of this resource (sand). In this case, government wants to raise their income from the retribution of sand mining in Desa Sindumartani. So, in political economic perspective, the process of resource exploitation is facilitated by state, and this condition lays people in the marginal position.

However, a different story comes from Desa Umbulharjo. Since they has no sand resources, what is left in the village is only the rest of Merapi disaster that has destroyed their former village. The villagers then come up with an idea to
commodify the ruins and transform it onto a tourism site. A tourism business then
develop within the villagers. Thus, the available and valuable resource is not sand,
but tourism area, which provide the whole combination of history, culture, Merapi
panorama, and many more. This resource is able to raise the people income and
profits. Furthermore, it also motivate people to establish a paguyuban that is
running the tourism sector in Merapi area, called Merapi Tour.

In Desa Umbulharjo, people, especially youths, are collaborated in one community
to enhance their tourism area. Desa Umbulharjo, which is well-known as village
where the famous Mbah Maridjan used to live before he passed away due to the
Merapi Eruption on October 2010, also offers the Merapi Mountain atmoshphere
and panorama. Moreover, the people from Merapi Tour also offers touring to the
area of Merapi with jeep or offroad motorcycle, and the tracking to National
Conservation of Mountain Merapi (Taman Nasional Gunung Merapi) is also
interesting. Those resources motivate people to manage the area and their services
in order to invite tourists, and with those facilities, indeed, tourist are always
willingful to coming back.

The profit has been shared and managed by local community. Whoever wants to
work in the tourism sector needs to be registered in the community, then they
would get paid based on how many days they worked. The profit from tourism is
collected in small village official to be used when something urgent is happening in
sudden. Thus, the spirit that people in Desa Umbulharjo have is very impressive.
The way they stand up after all that is happening is also insightful. They iniciated
the Merapi Tour without assistance from any department in the government.

Moreover, one interesting story comes from Pelemsari. The whole people in
Pelemsari iniciated to relocate themselves independently. Based on the money that
they collected one another, they bought a land for 80 households, then they
proposed certain money to build houses to province government independently.
The head of Pelemsari said that the first thought that came to their minds was to be relocated and they asked the government to help. It is approved by government through NGOs assistances (interview, 11 September 2013).

From the interview, it can be seen that the people in Umbulharjo has been able to transform their social capital to a collective economic capital. It can be an interesting story in Umbulharjo. But it should also be noted that Umbulharjo has been the biggest village that was affected from Merapi eruption and has got many reliefs both from government and non-government organizations. In the village, most of the housing facilities are built either by government or corporations through their CSR programs. For example, the reconstruction fund of this village comes from REKOMPAK project, (a collaborative donor-funded project led by the World Bank. Thus, they have nothing to worry about their environment or basic needs since their basic facilities has been covered by development projects.

In this context, Merapi Eruption implied on the existance of new resource—tourism objects. Due to this resource, which is not only directly coming from nature, but the culture side also does exist, different consequences implied. Moreover the tourism, as resource, needs people who runs on the work mechanism. Therefore, the capital flows upto Desa Umbulharjo to enhancing the local capacity. On the other side, capital flows to ensure that the tourism could give profits.

This situation is also supported with certain things: (1) mass media publication onto Desa Umbulharjo, especially when Merapi was erupted on 2010; (2) the area of Desa Umbulharjo which is near by the tourism area in the previous situation; (3) many private institution give assistance and financial aid to the people aftermath of Merapi Eruption. Though the government does not directly support the Merapi Tour with financial aid, they facilitate the people in Desa Umbulharjo to socialize the products and service that is offered by Merapi Tour.
D. Analyzing the Gap: Why Development Fails to Address Post-Disaster Problems

The story from Desa Sindumartani and Desa Umbulharjo has demonstrated the dissimilarity. The people participation on utilizing the available and valuable resources in both villages are different. People in Desa Umbulharjo actively participate on utilizing the resource and enhancing their capacity to optimize the utility of resource, meanwhile people in Desa Sindumartani have no access to utilize the resource. Indeed, the gap has existed, and it causes the problem.

Why is the development in Desa Umbulharjo and Desa Sindumartani dissimilar? It could be analyzed through these three aspects. Firstly, development institutions. In the local context of Indonesia, development is not merely seen as ‘what is instructed in the standard operating procedure or law’ but also how community perceives state and deal with the state in daily activities. This research has found out that development institutions have failed to address structural problems in the village. But if the development institutions fail, how do the community fulfill their needs? The answer lies to the social capital in the village. The dissimiliarity between Umbulharjo and Sindumartani appears because their approach in capitalizing social capital differs each others. The attempt to capitalize social capital is also determined by any structural problems in the village. Umbulharjo can be more successful in developing social capital because they do not face a complex structural problems rather than Sindumartani which has to deal with sand mining and broken road. It is why there are some gaps in development process in local level.

Secondly, resource commodification. Merapi Eruption implicated on the existance of new resource, sand, and it could give profit when people explore and sell it. The resource could give profit when it becomes a commodity. The problem is, sand commodification could be done with strong capital support, because it needs heavy
equipments and trucks. It could not be reached by people in Desa Sindumartani who are mostly working as farmers and hodge. So, the commodification only give so much profits to the ones who owns high capital, and it is only possibly coming from other area. Moreover, there is no teamwork on managing the resource. They could actually establish a community to explore the resource, then they would also think about resolving the possibly problem that is raised.

*Thirdly*, the access to capital. Merapi Eruption also implicated to the disruption to the capital access of people in both villages, Desa Sindumartani and Desa Umbulharjo, due to human and material losses. Both, social development formation and technocratic development, addressed this problem. Moreover, the societies in both villages particulary have fine social capital. Thus, the rehabilitation and reconstruction process in society run well. However, related to the commodification process on each village, there are two different stories. In Desa Umbulharjo, the commodification process create wider people capacity. People in Desa Umbulharjo become manpower, and it creates bigger access to capital for them. Meanwhile, in Desa Sindumartani the commodification process does not lay people as main actor, and it turns out that the resource is even exploited.

The story of commodification and access to capital turn to be very logic when it is related to two development schemes. The scheme of technocratic development views the commodification process and capital as the way of state development funding. So, state would facilitate the process of resource exploitation in Desa Sindumartani and people exploitation of local people in Desa Umbulharjo. The stand of state demonstrates that particulary state has relative authonomy to capital accumulation (Alavi 1972). State is involved on accumulating capital, and they also have certain interest on it. It is demonstrated clearly when state regulate the retribution for mining the sand, and when state facilitates Merapi Tour. However, part of the profit would be income for the state.
Meanwhile, in the scheme of social development, the commodification and capital are the target to be achieved in society development. PNPM and REKOMPAK, which both are conducted by world bank, view that in order to build the society up, it is necessary to build their capacity and to comply with market. In Desa Umbulharjo and Desa Sindumartani, this development scheme operates in the Minawisata and Merapi Tour, which both use social capital as the way to comply with market system. However, as it is often criticized, this logic could strengthen the society, though it could cause society neglect their structural environment outside of social community (Carroll 2010, Harriss 2004), so the phenomenon of damaged road which is not directly related to society is neglected. This logic will strengthen the social institution, but in the same time also create the gap among groups of society.

CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION

What is the relations between development and disaster resilience? This report has been trying to address those questions and providing adequate explanations on the nexus between disaster risk reduction policy and development in Indonesia. Drawn upon the local context of Sleman Regency, which is represented by two cases from Sindumartani and Umbulharjo village, this report shows that the effectiveness of disaster risk reduction policy is determined by their successful cooperation with development regimes in the very local context.

Theoretically, the concept of resilient community stands on the capability of community to overcome the hazard, not only physically, but also socially, economically, and environmentally (HFA 2005, Marti, 2004). It leads to a possible linkage between development and disaster risk reduction. This research has
concluded that Hyogo Framework for Action is linked with a broader millennium development project proposed by the United Nations.

In the national level, the linkage is shown by the Law 24/2007 on disaster management and national action plan for disaster risk reduction. But this research also demonstrated that in local context, the linkage is yet to be implemented comprehensively. The current development model in Indonesia, which based on the technocracy and concentrated on the bureaucratic structure, has limitation on building the resilient community. Those limitations could be identified from bureaucratic overlapping, which cause government failures on addressing the people’ economic-political problem, and those problems emerge from the outside community, called structural/external problem, whereas in the context of building resilient society, the main point is to maintain the society access to economy, social, and environment.

Thus, in what circumstances could development strengthen the society and vise versa? There are two answers according to our analysis. First, development strengthen the resilient community to disaster. Based on the analysis above, it is demonstrated that development could strengthen the resilient community if the logic of development adequate two conditions: (1) empowering the internal potency of society on fulfilling their social-economic-environmental needs; (2) maintaining the social access and the economy of society, and also being able to solve the external problems in society. On the contrary, when development does not successfully address those two circumstances, there will be contradiction that could degrade the resilient community to disaster.

Secondly, the disaster provide the opportunity to development. Based on the analysis above, it is demonstrated that disaster provides the opportunity to development, when there is available and valuable resource and the society has the capability to manage the resource. Thus, disaster could provide the opportunity to
development. Otherwise, the development could not be conducted optimally, when the available and valuable resource is not managed based on the capability of society.

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